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OF MACE AND MEN: TORT LAW AS A MEANS 
OF CONTROLLING DOMESTIC CHEMICAL 
WARFARE 
JOSEPH A. PAGE* 
The use of MACE and other chemical sprays by the police and the 
public has caused considerable comment and controversy during the last 
several years. Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, Professor Page 
analyzes the efficacy of present law to control the misuse of chemical 
sprays. In this analysis Professor Page first discusses the deve/opmellt of 
the use of MACE and the heated controversy that surrounds both its 
employment and potentially deleterious effects. He then turns to the 
application of intentional tort, negligence, warranty, and strict liability 
concepts as methods by which victims of MACE might hold the user or 
manufacturer liable for injuries incurred. He then concludes that although 
legislation exists that to some degree can be utilized to regulate the public 
sales of chemical sprays, it has been left to the courts to impose effective 
public restraints on police use of these weapons. 
I've grown accustomed to the MACE, 
I breathe it out, I breathe it in, 
I've grown accustomed to that breeze 
That knocks me to my knees, 
One whiff, one sniff, 
And I go stiff,' 
In 1965, several police departments around the country purchased 
and initiated use of a new weapon, destined to have a considerable 
impact on law enforcement techniques.2 Manufactured by the General 
Ordinance Equipment Corporation (GOEC)3 and marketed under the 
trade name CHEMICAL MACE~~ this innovation in police 
*A.B., 1955, LL.B., 1958, LL.M., 1964, Harvard University. Associate Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center. Member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
1 From a parody included in "Dock-et To Me," in the Annual Christmas Spirits Production 
of the <:;hicago Bar Association, in Chicago, Ill., Dec. 16-20, 1968, reprinted with permission. 
•see generally Applegate, The Chemical Mace: Evaluation of a New Police Weapon for 
Mob Control or Individual Defense. LAW AND ORDER, June 1966, at 48; Coates, Safe Police 
Weapons, Sci. & TECHNOLOGY, May 1968, at 52; Sagalyn & Coates, Wanted: Police Weapons 
That Do Not Kill. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1967 (Magazine), at 6. 
3 For an excellent account of the invention of MACE and its early promotion, see G.' WILLS, 
THE SECOND CIVIL WAR 87-95 (1968) (paperback). 
'CHEMICAL MACE and MACE are trademarks of the General Ordnance Equipment 
Corporation. CHEMICAL MACE reg. U.S., Pat. Off. As used in this article, MACE refers 
specifically to the aforementioned product. Other spray devices arc similarly indicated by the usc 
of all capitals. 
In common parlance the word "mace" is often used generically to describe any similar 
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weaponry was originally invented as a self-protection device for use by 
the general public.5 Its potential in the .field of law enforcement, 
however, gained quick recognition, and it soon became celebrated as 
an allegedly humane alternative to the pistol and billy club.6 
CHEMICAL MACE, or MACE as it is more commonly known, 
is a liquid, pressurized in small canisters that can be carried in the 
hand or even built into the tip of a nightstick.7 The canister projects a 
stream of chemical droplets that vaporize on contact and take 
immediate effect. Although MACE was not the first chemical spray 
adopted for use by individual policemen, earlier sprays projected a fog 
or mist that was not selective and could blow back on the user in 
adverse weather conditions.8 In comparison, because MACE takes the 
form of a relatively heavy liquid spray, it can be utilized effectively 
against selected individuals and thus eliminates the risk of the hunter 
becoming the quarry. Its effect upon the victim, as described by one 
police consultant, is such that: "[W]hen even a small percentage of 
the droplet burst pattern strikes the face, an intense burning and 
tearing action takes place. . . . The combination of the two effects 
will temporarily distract, disable and incapacitate the recipient. " 9 
THE RISING USE OF CHEMICAL SPRAYS AS POLICE WEAPONS 
MACE quickly became popular, as favorable publicity led to 
additional orders from law enforcement groups, which in turn led to 
even greater publicity.1° For the new product, 1967 proved to be an 
auspicious year. Urban unrest stimulated the full emergence of the 
"law-and-order" issue as a matter of pressing national concern. At 
the same time, police began to use MACE to quell social and political 
disorders.U 
chemical aerosol spray. Widespread use of the noun "mace" and the verb "to mace" has 
become a matter of great concern to GOEC, lest the terms become generic and the trademark 
rights be lost. See letter from GOEC's President John A. Campbell in CoM~IONWEAL, Apr. 18, 
1969, at 142. 
$Pittsburgh physicist Alan Litman invented CHEMICAL MACE to provide his wife with a 
self-defense weapon. G. WILLS, supra note 3, at 91. It is interesting to note that its usage has 
begun to revert to this original purpose. See notes 18-19 infra and accompanying text. 
•see. e.g .. Applegate, supra note 2, at 51; TIME, Sept. I, 1967, at 10. 
7Coates, supra note 2, at 54-55. 
"Applegate, supra note 2, at 51-52. In addition, some of these earlier devices were considered 
unreliable because of malfunctions in the delivery system. See note 17 infra. 
"Applegate, supra note 2, at 53. 
10 ln order to meet the increasing demand, GOEC quadrupled its production during a two 
month period in the summer of 1967. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 1967, at I, col. 4; see, e.g .• 
Duncan, Mace: The Methods of Madness, RAMPARTS, June 29, 1968, at 62; TIME, Jan. 3, 1969, 
at 60; Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, Oct. 17, 1966, § B, at 10, col. 3. 
"See. e.g., TI~IE, May 17, 1968, at 52; San Francisco Examiner, Oct. 18, 1967, at 13, col. I. 
See also G. WILLS, supra note 3, at 94-95. 
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Because of the overemphasis on its capacity to disable, MACE 
originally acquired a somewhat deceptive mystique. The use of terms 
such as "instant apathy"12 and "stun gun " 13 gave currency to the 
impression that it contained some mysterious new chemical, perhaps 
even nerve gasY According to officials in Newburgh, N.Y., the mere 
presence of MACE canisters hanging from the belts of policemen was 
enough to cut short a civil disturbance during the summer of 1967 .JG 
However, in actuality, MACE is no more than liquid 
chloroacetenophenone (CN), the basic ingredient in standard tear gas, 
with a kerosene-like substance added to make the spray stick and 
persist.t6 
GOEC's CHEMICAL MACE was not the only aerosol spray 
being manufactured during this period for sale to law enforcement 
agencies}? Although some of the other sprays failed to interest the 
police, they soon joined a variety of chemical aerosol weapons being 
offered for sale to the general public.t8 Even MACE itself has begun 
12Riot Control, SAT. EVE. PosT, Apr.20, 1968, at 30; TI~IE, May 5, 1967, at 50. 
"Harvey, Stun Gun: Sleeve Ace for Good Guys. Alexandria (La.) Town Talk, Mav 25. 
1967, reprinted in GEOC, Chemical Mace (promotional material) (on file with author). 
usee. e.g .. P. O'DONNELL, A TASTE FOR DEATH 172 (1969); Leman, MAC£: Weapotl for 
the Homefront, 'viET-REPORT, Jan. 1968, at 21. Contra. Maury, Dispelling the Myths of 
Aerosol Liquid Tear Gas Weaponry, LAW AND ORDER, Dec. 1967 (reprint on file with author). 
'~N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967, at 17, col. 2. 
"See Applegate, supra note 2, at 53; Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, Fact 
Sheet on Chemical Mace, enclosed in letter from William H. Stewart, Surgeon General of the 
Public Health Service, to All Health Officers (state, territorial, county, and city), May 2, 1968. 
See generally. HUDDLE, Tt:AR GAS FOR RIOT COSTROL 21-2~(Legislative Reference Service, 
Library of Congress, SP 147, March 5, 1968). For a discussion of pre-MACE tear gas weapons, 
see T. SWEARINGEN, TEAR GAS MUNITIONS (1966). 
17 GOEC's foremost competitor appears to be Federal Laboratories which produces 
PEACEMAKER and STREAMER. CN sprays using a formula similar to that of MACE. 
Other less successful competitors include Penguin Industries, maker of the CN spray DEPUTY. 
and Maze Chemical and Mfg. Corp., maker of the CS spray PARALYZER. which is available 
to the public and is the only CS spray currently on the general market. 
MARKETING/Com!UNICATION. Dec. 1968, at 60. Both the DEPUTY and the PEACEMAKER 
have been found unsatisfactory by at least one police department. See memorandum from W. J. 
Collier. Crime Detection Lab, to Capt. R. Newton, Phoenix (Ariz.) Police Dept., August 25, 
29, 1967, on file with author (DEPUTY's nozzle clogged, its range was only four feel, the 
container leaked and it produced a mist instead of a stream). 
CS sprays, which are comprised of chlorobenzylmalononitrile, a tear gas more powerful than 
CN in fog, smoke, or powder form, are considered ineffective since no eye irration results unless 
the spray directly contacts the eye surface, and undesirable since the effects arc of unnecessarily 
long duration because the agent tends to stay on the affected area rather than evaporate. Set• 
Crockett, Riot Control Agents, THE Pol.ICE C111t:t-. reb. 1969, at 12, 13. 
'"The whole area of chemical aerosal sprays has recently become the focus of congressional 
attention. See Hearings on the Public Sale of Protective Ch!•mical .'>'prays Before the Subcomm. 
for Con.\Umers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce. 91st Cong .. 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter 
cited as Consumer Hearings] (because these hearings have not yet been officially published, 
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to find its way into the hands of the public.19 A predictable corollary 
has been the increased use of aerosol weapons by criminals.20 • 
Early in 1968, the use of chemical weapons by law enforcement 
agencies received two important boosts. President Johnson, in a 
message to Congress, stated that "[r ]evolvers and nightsticks are 
clearly inadequate . . .. New weappns and chemicals-effective but 
causing no permanent injury-have been and are being developed."21 
Recognizing the limited knowledge of their potential and limitations, 
the President ordered that studies of the new weapons be undertaken.22 
The second boost occurred shortly thereafter when the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, in discussing police 
weapons, stressed "the urgent need for nonlethal alternatives, " 23 and 
recommended that the Government "undertake an immediate 
program to test and evaluate nonlethal weapons. " 24 
These statements, while endorsing the need for nonlethal police 
weapons such as chemical sprays, also underscored a disquieting 
aspect of the increased development and employment of MACE. Both 
the President and his Commission spoke of the need for research and 
testing; the sprays, however, had been widely used for more than two 
years.25 Their statements perhaps reflected concern for the growing 
MACE controversy, which paralleled the stepped-up police use of the 
sprays and their subsequent availability to the general public. 
THE MACE CONTROVERSY 
An analysis of the MACE controversy reveals two levels of 
criticism and rebuttal. One concerns the question whether even when 
properly handled, chemical sprays may cause an amount of physical 
harm disproportionate to t~at which the manufacturers claim and the 
citations herein refer to the printed statements of the witnesses on file with the author). See also 
Page, Mace for the Masses, ComiOSWJ:AL, Apr. Ill, 1969, at 141. There is very little data on 
how many of these weapons are in the hands of the public. In Aug. 1968 the Wall Street 
Journal reported that franchisers in 31 states had sold 250,000 PREVENTORS. a spray using 
the MACE formula. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 1968, at 4, col. 2. 
"See Page, supra note 18; MAYDAY, Nov. ·24-Dec. 6, 1968, at I. 
"'See Page, supra note 18, at 143; CRI~IE CONTROL DIGEST, Feb. 28, 1968, at 16; N.Y. 
Times, May 13, 1969, at I, col. 7; Washington Post, Apr. 2, 1969, § A. at 10, col. 2. 
%ll. JOHNSON. THE CHALLENGE OF CR!~IE TO OUR SOCIETY. H.R. Doc. No. 250, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1968). 
:!:lid. 
:!:!NATIONAL ADVISORY CO~I~t'N ON CiVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 330-31 (Bantam ed., 1968). 
: 11 d. at 492. 
10 By Mar. 1968, more than 3,000 law enforcement agencies had adopted aerosol sprays for 
use. CRI~U: COSTROL DIGEST. Mar. 13, 1968, at 7. 
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users intend. The other concerns risks of injury created by improper 
use of the sprays. 
POTENTIAL FOR INJURY 
The manufacturers of the sprays and the law enforcement agencies 
that have adopted them continually insist that the new weapons can 
cause only temporary harm to the victim.26 The record, however, 
would seem to establish beyond cavil that the testing of sprays before 
they were put on the market was not particularly thorough.27 Police 
departments often staged demonstrations with the sprays, but these 
were more in the nature of public relations performances than 
scientific experiments and took place only after the decision to adopt 
the sprays had been reached.28 In essence, inadequately tested chemical 
sprays were being added to police arsenals. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that protests were soon raised. The 
most vigorous came from Dr. Lawrence Rose, a San Francisco 
opthalmologist, who reported 12 cases of MACE exposure.29 In each 
26The directions for the use of MK IV CHEMICAL MACE state that the victim will be 
"temporarily disabled without permanent injury or marking .... " The New York Times has 
reported GOEC's president as claiming "[t]here is no lasting damage ... and within a half 
hour the person has completely recovered." N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967, at 17, col. 3. A UPI 
dispatch attributed to Alan Litman, the inventor of MACE, the statement that "there are no 
known toxic after effects." Washington Evening Star, Aug. 4, 1967, § A at 3, col. 3. 
Perhaps the ultimate claim is the item in Time that some policemen call MACE the "gentle 
persuader." TIME, Sept. I, 1967, at 10. 
The sprays actually do eliminate the principal danger of the tear gas gun, a weapon which 
has been in existence for decades. The guns fire cartridges filled with tear gas, which when 
discharged at close range, can inflict permanent damage by causing fragments of wadding, 
metal, or solid particles of the tear gas itself to penetrate the eye of the victim. See, e.g., Adams, 
Fee & Kenmore, Tear-Gas Injuries: A Clinical Study of Hand Injuries and an Experimental 
Study of its Effects on Peripheral Nerves and Skeletal Muscles in Rabbits, 48 J. OF BONE AND 
JOINT SURGERY 436 (1966) (Am. Vol.); Hoffman, Eye Burns Caused by Tear Gas, 51 BRIT. J. 
OPTHALMOLOGY 265 (1967); Levine & Stahl, Eye Injury Caused by Tear-Gas Weapons, 65 AM. 
J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 497 (1968). The delivery mechanism of the sprays does away with this 
particular hazard. 
27 GOEC sponsored two experiments involving nine animals. Neither test indicated any 
injurious effects other than a redness of the eyes which disappeared in 72 hours. The sprays were 
discharged, however, at a distance of six feet. Hazleton Laboratories, Inc., Acute Eye Irritation-
Rabbits: Mark IV Formula, Final Report, Apr. 12, 1966; Hazleton Laboratories, Inc., Acute 
Contact Exposure-Monkey: Mark IV Type A Chemical Mace, Final Report, Mar. 8, 1966; 
(reports submitted to GO EC; on file with author) . 
.,.See, e.g., (Rochester, N.Y.) Democrat and Chronicle, Aug. 3, 1967, § B, at I, col. 4; letter 
from Jarrett Williams, President of the Taylor-Jones County Medical Society, Abilene, Texas, 
to Warren Dodson, Chief of the Abilene Police Department, Jul. 31, 1967, on file with the 
author. After testing MACE on four persons in a single experiment, followed the next day by an 
eye examination, the Society was "convinced and assured that the material produces no lasting 
injuries." Letter from Jarrett Williams, supra. 
""Rose, Mace, A Dangerous Police Weapon, PROCEEDINGS OF 3RD CONGRESS, EUROPEAN 
Soc. OF OPHTHALMOLOGY, June 1968, at 448. 
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instance his patients had been hit in the face by a liquid stream from 
a distance of six to 12 inches and subsequently had been afforded no 
opportunity to wash out their eyes. Each suffered serious injuries.30 
Dr. Rose also conducted tests on three rabbits, whose eyes were 
sprayed with MACE at a distance of six inches. He reported that one 
rabbit "developed a dense scar in the line of vision. " 31 
An article in the New Republic, arguing that MACE could "add 
another dimension to police brutality," raised the first objections to 
the weapon on a national level.32 In addition, a number of 
developments since that time have fortified the heightening criticism 
of chemical sprays. In the spring of 1968, the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons issued a policy statement forbidding prison personnel to carry 
aerosol chemical dispensers except when authorized, limiting such 
authorization to situations in which a single prisoner "barricades 
himself and cannot be approached without definite danger to 
personnel or to himself. " 33 The report further called for the immediate 
treatment of prisoners who had been sprayed.34 
Less than two months later, the Surgeon General made public a 
warning letter which attracted nationwide attention.35 In cautious 
language, he noted that "the design of 'Chemical Mace' . . . clearly 
increases the possibility of more than transient effects to the exposed 
individual unless treatment is prompt," and set forth instructions on 
the proper treatment of MACE victims.36 A supplemental fact sheet, 
however, admitted that "[t]he available evidence regarding the effects 
:so Four suffered second degree burns of the eyelids and facial skin. One sustained a superficial 
corneal scar outside the line of vision. In four cases, the victims "experienced confused 
cerebration with an accompanying difficulty in answering simple questions, loss of recent memory. 
dysequilibrium, and apprehension which lasted one to two hours after exposure." All incurred 
an intense burning pain on the eyes and skin, and some respiratory difficulty. /d. 
~• /d. at 451. 
"Rapoport, Mace in the Face, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 1968, at 14, 15. Other 
subsequent publications and disclosures fueled the growing controversy over the use of MACE. 
A pediatrician, treating a teenager who had been sprayed by police, said "[t]here's no question 
about it (Mace) being bad for the respiratory system where there is already a lot of edema 
(swelling) in bronchial troubles, such as asthma." York (Pa.) Gazette and Daily, Apr. 4, 1968. 
A prison physician has gone so far as to say that "[I]f a person has heart trouble or acute asthma, 
this man could suffer a fatal dosage." /d. See also Kalman •. -I Critique c~{ M.-1 CE . .-1 Rim Comrol 
Agent, CALIFORNIA's HEALTH, Sept. 1968, at 3 (significant increase of victim's blood pressure): 
testimony of Dr. Stuart Frank to the San Francisco City Council on the Toxic Effects of Chemical 
MACE. May 9, 1968, on file with author. 
:llBUREAU OF PRISONS, POLICY STATEMENT, No. 20300.1 (Mar. 25, 1968). 
~1 ld. 
""Letter from William H. Stewart, Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, to All 
Health Officers (state, territorial, county, and city), May 2, 1968. See also NEWSWEEK. June 10. 
1968, at 79; TI~IE, May 17, 1968, at 52; Washington Post, May 3, 1968, § A. at I, col. 7. 
""Letter from William H. Stewart, supra note 35. 
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is not complete and does not permit the drawing of final 
conclusions at this time. " 37 
On June 6, 1968, a research team from the Department of 
Pharmacology at the University of Michigan published the results of 
an investigation of Mark IV CHEMICAL MACE, undertaken at the 
behest of the Ann Arbor City Council and Department of Police. The 
study underscored the danger of injury "if the lachrymator were 
liberated in large quantities in a small room or other confined space, 
since breathing to survive would result in inhalation of the gas in spite 
of its irritant properties, " 38 and pointed out that "misuse of Chemical 
Mace ... has a potential for injury or even death."39 Another study, 
released by the Berkeley, Cal., Director of Public Health, concluded, 
inter alia, that MACE is a potentially dangerous weapon,~0 and that 
its hazards are greatly increased if improperly used.~ 1 
The criticism and controversy over the use of sprays has 
continued,42 marked by such startling revelations as the failure of 
MACE to meet Army safety requirements.43 A review of th~ available 
evidence, however, brings to light certain indisputable gaps in what is 
known about the potential hazards of the sprays. Almost all the 
testing has involved MACE and has focused on the risk of eye 
injury .44 Minimal attention has been devoted to other kinds of harm. 
37Surgeon General, supra note 16. 
••Report ·or Macleod, Villarreal & Seevers, Dept. of Pharmacology, Medical School, 
University of Michigan, to Ann Arbor Police Dept., June 6, 1968, at 7 [hereinafter cited as 
Michigan Report]. The experiments upon which the Report was in part based are described in 
Macleod, Chemical Mace: Ocular Effects in Rabbits and Monkeys, 14 J. FORENSIC Sci. 34 
(1969). 
39 Michigan Report 8. The Report further suggests that MACE can be used safely if the 
victim is alert, has normal protective reflexes, such as blinking, and is sprayed with the 
minimum dosage necessary for incapacitation. Severe or possibly permanent damage, however, 
may occur from direct exposure of the eye to the spray due to misuse of the weapon. Such 
misuse could result from a direct discharge into the eye area at close range, a prolonged 
discharge into the face or eyes, or an excessive discharge in a closed space. The Report also 
notes that there is no evidence to indicate the possibility of significant injury other than to 
the eyes, skin, or mucous membranes, and that such injury would be due to the CN agent, not 
the solvent or propellant. I d. at I 8- I 9. 
~0 Memorandum on "Use of Mace" from Alvin R. Leonard, M.D., Director of Public 
Health, Berkeley, Cal., to William C. Hanley, City Mgr., Berkeley, Cal., Sept. 5, 1968. 
~·"With proper and prudent use, the danger of serious or permanent damage from this 
weapon is minimal. With improper use (too close to the person, person lacking normal reflexes, 
in a closed space), or delay in post-exposure treatment, the hazard increases sharply." /d. 
usee, e.g .• Washington Post, Feb. 23, 1969, § A, at 21, col. I (D.C. doctor discloses 
possibility of permanent lung and kidney damage). 
"Letter from Brig. Gen. Donald D. Blackburn, Acting Deputy Chief of Research and 
Development, Department of the Army, to Senator Abraham Ribicoff, May 15, 1969, reprinted 
in Office of Senator Ribicoff, Press Release, May 19, 1969, on file with author. But see Forberg 
& Byers, Chemical Mace: A Non-Lethal Weapon, 9 J. TRAUMA 339 (1969). 
"See notes 27-28, 30 supra. 
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Some data exists on PEACEMAKER45 and STREAMER,46 but 
virtually nothing is available on the numerous other irritants offered 
for sale to the police and the general public.47 
MISUSE OF SPRAYS 
At least two explanations can be offered for the misuse of the· 
sprays. First, the manufacturers made such extravagant claims 
concerning the harmlessness of the new weapons48 and the law 
enforcement agencies adopting them gave such inadequate instructions 
to the individuals to whom they were issued that improper handling 
was inevitable.49 An illustration which lends support to this argument 
is the police practice of resorting to chemical sprays during civil 
disturbances.5° Claims by GOEC of MACE's effectiveness in riot 
control,51 combined with pressures on police to meet the challenge of 
urban disorders, have led to reliance on MACE as a weapon against 
demonstrators. In actual practice, however, the police often direct the 
spray indiscriminately at crowds or groups in order to disperse them.52 
In these circumstances it is virtually impossible to provide prompt 
medical treatment to MACE victims. 
t5See note 17 supra. 
"Hazleton Laboratories, Inc., Acute Eye Irritation-Rabbits: Sample "F", Final Report, 
Jan. 19, 1968 (submitted to Federal Laboratories, Inc.; copy on file with author). 
nThe Younger Laboratories of St. Louis, Mo., conducted experiments using PARALYZER 
and concluded that the weapon was not an irritant to the skin, but was an eye irritant. The eyes 
of the three rabbits used in the tests cleared after 72 hours. Younger Laboratories, Certificate of 
Analysis ["Paralyzer"], Feb. 6, 1969 (submitted to Maze Chern. & Mfg. Corp.; copy on file 
with author). 
It is interesting to note that GOEC has purportedly stated that "several competitive devices 
have come on the market of (sic) different formulation which have caused some injuries. 
[GOEC] ascribes these injuries -to an excessive Chloroacetenophonone content and/or an inept 
choice of organic carrier solvents." Michigan Report 7. 
"See note 26 supra. 
taWhether such inadequacy is sufficient to constitute a legal wrong should be forthcoming as 
a result of damage suits alleging that instructions given to police officers in the use of chemical 
sprays were inadequate. See cases cited note 68 infra. 
A consultant to the International Association of Chiefs of Police testified before the Senate's 
Consumer Subcommittee that, regardless of instructions, it was unrealistic to expect policemen 
not to aim at the victim's face when using a chemical spray in any sort of emergency situation. 
Consumer Hearings. supra note 18 (testimony of Thompson S. Crockett). The Michigan Report 
suggests that discharge of a spray in this manner constitutes misuse of the weapon. Michigan 
Report, supra note 38, at 7-8. 
""See note 10 supra and accompanying text. 
51 See Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, Oct. 17, 1966, § B, at 10, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 
1967, at 17, col. 3. See generally Applegate, supra note 2, at 76. 
"'One police expert has testified that this tactic can cause the people in the front ranks of the 
crowd to be trampled, and hence is improper. Consumer Hearings (testimony of Thompson S. 
Crockett). 
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A second explanation of excessive use of MACE is that it is 
merely another aspect of the police brutality problem. A possible new 
dimension is that the sprays require so little physical effort to fire that 
they ·may actually encourage the conscious application of 
unreasonable force, perhaps even as a punitive measure. Beyond 
scattered individual accounts of police brutality in the use of sprays, 
there is very little empirical data on this point. The Walker Report on 
violence at the Democratic Convention in Chicago, which describes 
twelve incidents in which the police employed MACE,53 is perhaps the 
closest approximation to a comprehensive study of the use of MACE 
during a civil disturbance. Each of the incidents arguably amounted 
to the use of unjustified or excessive force. On the other hand, a 
survey made by the Berkeley police department of 85 uses of MACE 
by the department over an IS-month period found only four instances 
of improper use.5~ 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO MACE 
In addition to the risk of bodily injury from the sp'ray itself, 
another hazard merits mention. In certain situations, chemical 
irritants may not repel assailants-the sprays may not affect persons 
under the influence of drugs or liquor, as well as lunatics and 
individuals in a state of extreme emotional excitement.55 MACE, 
therefore, may act as an escalator rather than a pacifier in civil 
disturbances, since it tends to enrage victims with a sense of 
humiliation and impotence,S6 possibly even leading to the use of 
''countersprays'' by demonstrators.57 
"'RIGHTS IN CONFLICT: THE WALKER REPORT TO THE NATIONAl Co~t~t'S ON nw CAUSES 
AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 176, 200, 202-03, 259, 269, 274, 281-82, 317, 323-24 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as WALKER REPORT). 
"'BERKELEY POLICE DEP"T. USE OF "CHE)IICAl MACE" 1-2 (City Manager Report :\o. 68-
37, 1968). 
05See id. at 2; Crockett, Riot Control Agents, THE POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 1969, 13. 
Notwithstanding the high state of emotion of rioters and attackers, some of the sprays on sale 
to the public advertise that they can rout such crowds. See. e.g .. Silver Spring-Wheaton (Md.) 
Advertiser, Aug. 21, 1968, at 5 (advertisement for PREVENTOR). 
••Incidents of MACE escalating resistance to police have been numerous enough to question 
the wisdom of its use on large crowds. A Richmond, Va., policeman tried MACE out on a dog 
"[a]nd the dog promptly tried out his teeth on the officer's leg." CRI~tE Co:-ITROJ. DIGEST, Feb. 
II, 1969, at 3. In Orlando, Fla., an argument with a city clerk over a refund for a business 
license ended with the man being fatally shot by the police chief who had sprayed him with 
MACE to quiet him, but instead enraged him. Orlando Sentinel, June 6, 1969, at I, col. 4. 
07See WALKER REPORT 235, 238, 262, 347, 352 (evidence of uses of sprays by demonstrators 
agamst law enforcement officials at 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago); N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 18, 1969, at 28, col. 4 (claim that SDS militants used MACE in disturbances at Columbia 
University); San Francisco Examiner, Apr. 7, 1969, at I, col. 3. 
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Other objections to MACE and similar sprays go beyond the 
immediate issues of bodily injury and riot control. It has been argued, 
for example, that the use of MACE by police may produce such a 
state of mental disarray in the victim that a subsequent arrest 
infringes upon his civil liberties.58 Furthermore, in the broadest 
context, the general subject of police technology carries with it the 
perplexing problem whether such development should be permitted to 
proceed, lest the state assume excessive power to intervene in and 
control the lives of its citizens. A correlative consideration is the 
extent to which a newly emerging "police-industrial complex" may 
become powerful enough to influence policy by maintaining, or even 
creating, a mood of fear, which will insure the continuous expenditure 
of large sums of money on law enforcement hardware.59 • 
Finally, there is an ethical or moral challenge to the propriety of 
indulging in what amounts to chemical warfare on a domestic level. It 
has been argued that since this sort of weaponry has been disavowed 
internationally,60 it certainly should not be tolerated on the domestic 
scene.61 The fact that the Government has resorted to the use of 
chemical weapons in Vietnam62 is, of course, no answer to this 
objection. On the other hand, it is strongly urged that the use of 
incapacitating chemical agents is more humane, both in war and 
domestic riot control, because of its temporary, nonlethal, and less 
destructive effect.63 Nevertheless, an ethical or moral distinction can 
be drawn between using MACE on an individual and clubbing him 
with a night stick. One approach could derive from a judgment 
whether and to what extent it is permissible for society to expose a 
person to chemical agents that are intentionally sprayed upon him and 
.. Bodenheimer & Rose, MACE's "Secret" Formula, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May II, 1968, at 
8; Duncan, supra note 10, at 63. 
~•see Price, Criminal Law and Technology: Some Comments, 16 U.C.LA.L. REV. 120, 133 
(1968). 
60See 2 L. 0PPENHEI~I. INTER:-;ATIONAL LAW § 113 (7th ed. 1952); Brownlie, Legal Aspects, 
in CBW: CHE~IICAL A:-/D BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 143-46 {Rose ed. 1968); HUDDLE, supra note 
16, at 15; 7 Co:-:G. REC. H2421 (daily ed. Apr. I, 1969) (remarks of Congressman McCarthy). 
"One must recognize, however, that some of the more cogent arguments against chemical 
and biological warfare-its capacity for wholesale destruction and its nonselectivity-simply do 
not apply to the use of sprays by police. See Meselson, Ethical Problems-Preventing CBW, in 
CBW:CHE~IICALA:-;D BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 163 {Roseed. 1968). 
•tSee S. HERSH. CHE~IICAL A:-lD BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: A~IERICA 's HIDDEN ARSENAL 
(1968); Kahn, CBW in Use: Vielllam, in CBW: CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 87 (Rose 
ed. 1968). 
6:1 Michigan Report, supra note 38, at 20. It must be admitted that if the effects of the sprays 
were limited to the manufacturers' claims and if the police did not misuse these weapons, they 
surely would be more "humane" than guns or nightsticks. Unfortunately, such is not the case. 
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that act upon and penetrate his body without his consent. In other 
words, the focus of this judgment would be on the biosphere and the 
degree to which modern technology should be allowed to tamper with 
it. 
The most cogent argument on ethical and moral grounds, 
however, is that a relaxation of restraints against the use of 
"humane" sprays may invite the introduction of more powerful 
chemical weapons for real or imagined needs.64 Indeed, the grim 
escalation of domestic chemical warfare has already begun. CS6" was 
discharged against students from a helicopter on the Berkeley college 
campus; demonstrators are now using chemical weapons;66 and the 
Army is about to introduce more potent CS aerosols which attack the 
respiratory system.67 The end does not appear in sight. 
TORT LAW 
In the past year, a number of personal injury actions have been 
filed against law enforcement agencies and/ or the manufacturers of 
chemical sprays.68 These cases will provide the judicial process with an 
opportunity to confront and assess the merits of the controversy 
whieh the sprays have spawned. They may also test the contemporary 
relevance of tort law. To the extent that the concern over the dangers 
posed by the sprays is well founded, MACE and its kin join a wide 
"'A former Defense Department official alarmingly summed up the philosophy behind the 
use of chemical gas in civil situations: 
'[W]e accomplish two purposes: controlling crowds and educating people on gas •• .' 
so that 'we [can] control the public outcry' against chemicals which hinders their use 
in wartime. 'If one could change the environment of public opinion about CBW 
(chemical and biological warfare),' the official said, 'we might be able to use 
something that otherwise would be ruled out.' 
Hersh, Your Friendly Neighborhood MACE, N.Y. REVIEW OF BooKs, Mar. 27, 1968, at 42. 
r.ssee note 17 supra . 
.. See note 57 supra. 
67 HUDDLE, supra note 16. CS was used in substantial quantities by the Paris riot police 
against rebellious French students during the events of May and June, 1968. P. LAURO, CE 
N'I:ST Qt.:'us DEBUT 107-08 (1968) (paperback); U.N.E.r. & S.N.E. SUP., LE LIVRE NOIR DES 
JOURNEES DE MAl 86-91 (Seuil ed. 1968) (paperback). 
63 Wright v. Ryan, No. C-1268 (D. Colo., Jan. 21, 1969); Lanier v. District of Columbia, No. 
2318-68 (D.D.C., Sept. 13, 1968); Gonzalo v. Arizona, No. C223343 (Ariz. Super. Ct., May 18, 
1969); Miguel v. Hinderliter, No. C217921 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Nov. 22, 1968); Marcellini v. City 
& County of San Francisco; No. 598081 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 27, 1968); Russell v. General 
Ordnance Equip. Corp., No. 591471 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 15, 1968); Marcellini v. General 
Ordnance Equip. Corp., No. 589974 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 2, 1968); Craig v. City of Sarasota, 
No. 69-266 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Feb. 21, 1969); Jennings v. City of Winter Park, No. 68-4047 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct., Sept. 6, 1968); Faulk v. City of Yonkers (N.Y. Super. Ct., July 30, 1968); Vaughan v. 
City of Estacada, No. 342266 (Ore. Cir. Ct., Oct. 2, 1968). Copies of the aforementioned 
complaints are on file with the author. 
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range of hazards attributable to modern technology. The degree to 
which tort law, acting through the mechanism of the private suit for 
money damages, can effectuate societal control over such hazards will 
furnish a useful insight into the law's vitality.69 
LIABILITY OF THE USER 
Battery. In the absence of a legal privilege to do so, a policeman 
or private citizen who intentionally sprays a person with a liquid 
chemical or who intentionally causes vapors from such a spray to 
come into contact with a person has committed an actionable 
battery7° and perhaps an assault.71 If such a person has a valid claim 
under a battery theory, he will be able to recover for all damages 
incurred, including those which the user had no reason to believe 
would result.72 Thus, although the defendant did not know and had no 
reason to know of the dangerous propensities of his chemical weapon, 
he nonetheless would be liable for harm which exceeded the damage 
he intended to inflict.73 
One privilege which can arise in intentional spray cases is that of 
self-defense, whereby a policeman or private citizen will not be liable 
upon proof that the plaintiff was, or reasonably appeared to be, 
threatening him with harm.74 Plaintiff, however, can defeat the 
privilege by establishing that the force used by defendant was 
excessive75-that it was "in excess of that which the actor 
correctly or reasonably believed to be necessary for his protection. ''76 
A corollary to this principle is that the privilege to intentionally inflict 
.,The compensation function of tort law will be tested also, but the MACE cases will add 
nothing to the general question whether tort suits for money damages are an adequate and 
effective means of compensating injured individuals. Of perhaps greater consequence will be the 
prophylactic impact of these cases upon the use, manufacture, and sale of sprays. 
70 \V. PROSSER, TORTS § 9 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as \V. PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. "[A)ll that is necessary is 
that the actor intended to cause the other, directly or indirectly, to come into contact with a 
foreign substance in a manner the other will reasonably regard as offensive." /d., comment cat 
31. 
71 \V. PROSSER § 10. Although no discharge takes place, a chemical spray may be used to 
threaten harm. Such conduct, absent a legal privilege, could amount to an actionable assault. /d. 
72 RESTATEMENT § 16(1). 
13fd. § 16, comment a. 
71 /d. § 63; \V. PROSSER § 19. 
75 \Vall v. Zeeb, 153 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1967) (use of tear gas gun to effect arrest). 
70 RESTATEMENT § 70(1). Defendant's good faith may be relevant on the issue of excessive 
force. In an action against a police officer for injuries sustained when at close range he fired his 
tear gas gun at plaintiff and caused him to lose an eye, the court held it was reversible error to 
omit reference to possible good faith on the issue of excessive force. Village of Barboursville ex ref. 
Bates v. Taylor, 115 W.Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485 (1934). 
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serious bodily harm is limited to situations in which the defendant is 
or reasonably appears, threatened with the same degree of harm.77 
Thus, if plaintiff does not confront defendant with such a threat, real 
or apparent, and defendant protects himself with a chemical spray, 
causing serious bodily harm to plaintiff,78 the latter should be able to 
recover upon proof that the user knew, or a reasonable person in his 
place would have known, of the dangerous propensities of the 
weapon.79 A policeman or a private citizen may also be privileged to 
use force to effectuate an arrest80 or to prevent the commission of a 
crime.81 Again, a showing of excessive force will defeat the privilege.82 
Where state or local officials, including police officers, 
intentionally misuse chemical weapons, injured victims may t'tilize an 
additional or alternative remedy under the civil remedy section of the 
Civil Rights Act,83 which enables them to sue in federal court for 
damages resulting from abridgments, by officials acting under color 
of state law, of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution or by federal law.84 
71 W. PROSSER § 19, at 112; RESTATE~IENT § 65. 
'"The Restatement defines "serious bodily harm" to include the "permanent or protracted 
loss of the function of any important member or organ." RESTATEMENT § 63, comment b. 
19 
"The reasonable character of the means which the actor uses is determined by what a 
reasonable man, under the circumstances which the actor knows or has reason to know exist at 
the time, would regard as permissible in view of the danger threatening him." I d. § 63, 
commentj, at 103. 
If the defendant did not know, and had no reason to know, that the weapon might cause a 
permanent injury, plaintiff might still be able to recover against the manufacturer and/or 
distributor of the spray. See text accompanying notes 105-24 infra. 
""RESTATE~IENT § 118. 
"'There is no common law privilege to use force to prevent a minor misdemeanor. ld. 
§ 140. There may be a privilege, however, to use force not likely or intended to cause serious 
bodily harm to prevent an affray or similar breach of the peace. ld. § 141. The same is true of 
riots, except that the actor may use force likely or intended to case serious bodily harm if the 
riot itself threatens serious bodily harm. /d. § 142. The use of force likely or intended to cause 
serious bodily harm also may be privileged when the actor is attempting to prevent a felony. 
/d. § 143. 
112The test of the amount of force that may be used in effecting an arrest or recapture is what 
the "actor reasonably believes necessary." /d. § 132. See generally Greenstone, Liability oj 
Police Officers for Misuse of Their Weapons, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 396, 400-05 ( 1967). 
In Chaudoin v. Fuller, a deputy sheriff, in the course of arresting plaintiff for disturbing the 
peace, fired a tear gas gun into his face from a distance of three feet. The court held this to be 
an unreasonable, unnecessary, and excessive use of force under the circumstances. 67 Ariz. 144, 
192 P.2d 243 (1948). 
x:tCivil Rights Act of 1871 § I, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). 
"'See Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 277 (1965). See also Ginger & Bell, Police Misconduct Litigation-Plaintiffs Remedies, in 
15 A:11. JuR. TRIALS 555 (1968); Page, State Law and the Damages Remedy Under the Civil 
Rights Act: Some Problems in Federalism, 43 DEN. L.J. 480 (1966). Two spray cases have been 
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Negligence. A person unintentionally injured as a direct or 
indirect result of the use of chemical irritants may be able to recover 
for negligence, if he can prove that the defendant handled the weapon 
carelessly and that such substandard conduct was the legal cause of 
the harm sustained.85 Several decisions involving tear gas guns shed 
light on the way courts might deal with the issues of standard of care 
and extent of liability in spray cases. 
In Has/em v. Jackson,86 plaintiff, a housemaid, was injured when a 
tear gas gun designed to look like a fountain pen discharged as she 
tried to tighten the cap. In an action against her employer, the owner 
of the pen, the court held that since the gun was a "dangerous 
instrumentality," defendant was under a duty to exercise a high 
degree of care in possessing it, and that leaving it on a breakfast table 
amounted to negligence as a matter of law.87 
In Wall v. Zeeb,88 however, it was held that the accidental 
discharge of a tear gas gun while in the hands of a policeman does not 
create in itself a presumption of negligence. The court added that such 
a presumption, if available at all, applies only to cases involving 
firearms and that the tear gas gun in question was not a "firearm" 
because it could fire only tear gas cartridges, and not live bullets.89 
This limitation on the term "firearm" seems to place nomenclature 
above reason and allows the result to turn on a rather unrealistic 
classification. 
Other decisions have not been so restrictive. In Paul v. Holcomb,90 
the court saw no need to make a specific ruling on whether a tear gas 
shell was a "dangerous instrumentality," since the standard of care is 
almost invariably that of a reasonably prudent man under the 
particular circumstances.91 Furthermore, the court found no error in 
the trial judge's instruction allowing the jury to impose a duty of 
brought under § 1983. Wright v. Ryan, No. C-1268 (D. Colo., Jan. 21, 1969); Lanier v. 
District of Columbia, No. 2318-68 (D.D.C.. Sept. 13, 1968). 
"'See generally Dillon v. Crowe, 406 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1969) (liability of private citizens); 4 
PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES, DA~IAGES 441-67 (l. Frumer, M. Friedman, l. Pilgrim, 
L. Zuckerman, R. Hollweg eds. 1967) (liability of police officers) . 
.. 68 Ohio App. 433, 40 N.E.2d 692 (1941). 
"'ld. at 436-37, 40 N.E.2d at 693-94. 
101 153 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 1967). 
"'Cf. note 163 infra and accompanying text. 
908 Ariz. App. 22, 442 P.2d 559 (1968). In Paul, a tear gas shell exploded in defendant's 
pocket as he sat down in plaintifrs restaurant. Plaintiff thought defendant's pants were on fire, 
and tried to help by slapping at them. In so doing. the tear gas came in contact with her face, 
causing serious injuries to her eyes. A jury verdict of $5,000 was affirmed, the court noting that 
the plaintiff was foreseeably within the risk created. 
91 /d. at 24, 442 P.2d at 561. 
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exercising extreme caution if they found the shell to be a "dangerous 
instrumentality.'' 
To date, only one reported case has dealt in depth with the 
substantive issue of the standard of care in the operational use of tear 
gas by the police. In Titcomb v. State,92 the state of New York was 
held liable for the negligence of state troopers who discharged a CN 
tear gas grenade into a room in which decedent had barricaded 
himself. Although the troopers eventually carried him from the room, he 
died from lack of oxygen shortly thereafter. The court found the State 
negligent in not giving the troopers adequate instructions about the 
dangers of discharging CN grenades in enclosed spaces; it also found 
the troopers negligent in using gas without having masks with them, 
thus delaying the victim's rescue for critical minutes.93 
The use of sprays by the police may create a further duty of care 
when the individual officer is privileged to resort to force. It now 
seems clear that victims of MACE require immediate treatment in 
order to avoid the risk of serious injury from chemical irritants.9~ The 
failure to provide such treatment, if it results in harm to the victim, 
might amount to actionable negligence.95 The duty to render first aid 
would fall upon the officer using the spray or, if an arrest is made, 
upon the officers in charge of the victim. To recover damages, the 
victim would have to establish that the police officers knew or should 
have known of the need for medical attention. 
Federal Laboratories, the manufacturer of a CN aerosol, has 
provided "wash-up cards" for issuance to spray victims by police.90 
Whether the distribution of these cards obviates the duty to provide 
medical treatment will depend upon the seriousness of the potential 
injuries spray victims might incur. If a court should find that a risk 
of permanent injury is involved, the cards probably would not shield 
the police from liability. Furthermore, since a principal function of 
such chemical weapons is to temporarily impair the recipient's vision, 
'
230 Misc. 2d 902, 222 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
03/d. at 911, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 605-06. For a discussion of the effect of sovereign immunity, 
see notes 97-100 infra and accompanying text. 
"See note 41 supra. 
"In Chaudoin v. Fuller, a favorable verdict was awarded plaintiff who alleged that defendant 
discharged a tear gas gun in his face from a distance of three feet, arrested him, and confined 
him in a jail where there were no first aid facilities. 67 Ariz. 144, 192 P.2d 243 ( 1948). See also 
Riley v. Rhay, 407 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1969); Hughes v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961): 
Coleman v. Johnston, 247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957) (suits brought under Civil Rights Act). 
"These cards explain the cause of the stinging and tearing, that it is not dangerous, and how 
to avoid skin irritation. Warning is also given to avoid applying oil or grease medication and 
not to bandage. See Crockett, supra note 17, at 16. 
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the cards would seem to be of limited value to individuals sprayed in 
the face. 
In addition to liability on the part of the law officer commiting 
the tort, if the plaintiff can establish that the misuse of the spray was 
within the scope of the tortfeasor's employment, he may be able to 
hold the governmental unit employing him vicariously liable.97 
Liability will depend upon how the courts in the particular jurisdiction 
deal with the doctrine of sovereign immunity .98 Most jurisdictions, 
while recognizing immunity with respect to municipalities, soften its 
impact by distinguishing between proprietary and governmental 
functions, imposing liability upon municipalities for torts committed 
in the exercise of the former, but not the latter.99 The general rule has 
been that police torts fall withm the latter, immune category,100 
although several jurisdictions have abolished the proprietary-
governmental distinction and hold municipalities vicariously liable for 
the torts of individual policemen.101 
Police department officials, however, may themselves be liable for 
negligence when misuse of sprays results from inadequate training of 
the officers who employ them, or when an officer who handles his 
weapon in an intentionally brutal manner was hired or retained after 
officials had notice, or should have had notice, of his unsuitably 
sadistic nature.102 
Another theory of negligence that might be asserted against 
executive governmental officials would be based upon an allegation of 
negligence in the adoption of the sprays, because the chemical irritants 
are unreasonably dangerous and create an unreasonable risk of harm 
to anyone sprayed. A defense against such a claim, however, might be 
that the officials performed the acts in the exercise of a discretionary 
function and are therefore immune from liability.103 Whether the 
07See generally \V. SEAVEY, LAw OF AGENCY § 89, at 156-58 (1964). Senior police officers 
are not, however, vicariously liable ror the torts or their men. See Note, The Tort Liability of 
Public Officers for the Acts of Their Subordinates, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 505-08. 
18See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 70, § 125. 
"'See 2 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW§ 11.07 (1968). 
100See id. § 11.11; 18 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.51 (3d ed. rev. 
1963); Mathes & Jones, Toward a ··scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in 
Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965). Cases involving tear gas have rollowed the general 
rule. Hagedorn v. Schrum, 226 Iowa 128, 283 N.W. 876 (1939); Luvaul v. City or Eagle Pass, 
408 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). 
101See Shapo, Municipal Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American 
Legal History, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475 (1963). 
unsee Greenstone, supra note 82, at 410-11. 
103See id. at 408-10; SA PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 85, at 201; Jarre, Suits Against 
Govemments and Officers-Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218-25 (1963); Note, The 
Tort Liability of Public Officers. supra note 97, at 508-10. 
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municipality could be held liable would depend again upon the 
particular jurisdiction's interpretation of the scope of sovereign 
immunity.10~ 
LIABILITY OF THE MANUFACTURER 
The manufacturers of chemical sprays may be liable under several 
different theories. When the user is injured by the spray itself because 
of a leaking canister, accidental discharge, or blowback of the 
chemical droplets, he should be able to recover under one or more of 
several theories: negligent construction105 or design106 of the weapon, 
failure to warn of the hazard which produced the injury,107 breach of 
implied108 or express warranty/09 and strict tort liability .110 
The various negligence theories offer no conceptual difficulties. 
Negligent construction suggests that a particular weapon contained a 
faulty delivery mechanism, a flaw in the composition of the liquid, or 
some such deviation from the manufacturer's own specifications. 
Negligent design suggests that the delivery mechanism, composition of 
the liquid, or other such feature, though meeting the manufacturer's 
specifications, nevertheless created an unreasonable risk of harm. The 
adequacy of a warning or of instructions for use will depend upon 
what the manufacturer knew, or should have known, about his 
product and the potential dangers it posed.111 Federal labeling 
requirements, if applicable, will be relevant in determining the 
adequacy of the warning on the label.112 
•••See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text. 
1o:;See genera/(1' I L. FRU~IER & M. FRIED~IAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (1968) (hereinafter 
cited as L. FRU~IER & M. FRIED~IAN]. 
•••See generally id. § 7; Noel, Manufacturer's 1\'eg/igence of Design or Directions jar l.'st• oj 
a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962). 
107 See generally. I L. FRU~IER & M. FRIEmiAN § 8; Noel, supra note I 06. 
""'See2 L. FRmtER& M. FRIED~IAN § 16.04(2]. 
10
'See id. § 16.04[4]. 
""See id. § 16A; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). 
111 1n Scurjield v. Federal Laboraties. Inc., the defendant-manufacturer was held to have 
discharged his duty to warn by informing the purchaser of a tear gas gun of its nature and 
purpose. Thus, even though defendant's salesman had stated to the purchaser that the weapon 
could not cause serious harm, defendant was not liable to a visitor of the purchaser who thought 
the weapon was a fountain pen, picked it up, and discharged it in his own face. 335 Pa. 145, 6 
A.2d 559 (1939). 
112See text accompanying notes 150-51 infra. Failure to comply with an applicable federal 
standard would be evidence of negligence, or perhaps even negligence per se. Set• Morris, Tht• 
Role of Administrative Safety Measures in .Vegligence Actions, 28 TEXAS L. REV. 143 (1949); 
Comment, Products Liability Based upon the Violation of Statutory Standards, 64 MICU. L. 
REV. 1388 (1966). 
When the manufacturer has complied with safety standards, such compliance constitutes 
evidence of due care; however, plaintiff should be allowed to introduce evidence to show that 
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Recovery by the User. If the user sustains harm because the 
weapon failed to function properly at a critical moment, thus ·enabling 
an assailant to inflict injury, he may be able to recover under the 
theories mentioned above, provided he can prove that the 
malfunctioning of the weapon was the proximate cause of the injuries 
suffered. If a person is injured as a result of his own possession or use 
of a spray which he bought at a public sale, and he seeks to recover 
from the manufacturer on a duty-to-warn theory, the manufacturer's 
compliance, or lack thereof, with applicable federal labeling 
requirements will be relevant on the issue of negligence. 
Recovery by the Victim. When plaintiff is the spray victim, either 
the user's intended target or an innocent bystander, the liability of the 
manufacturer will depend upon a combination of the following 
factors: (I) the manufacturer's conduct and/ or the qualitative nature 
of his product; (2) the seriousness of the plaintiff's injuries; and (3) 
the conduct of the user-whether he acted in a substandard manner, 
whether he intended to spray the victim, and, in the latter case, 
whether he was privileged to do so. 
The injured spray victim who wishes to assert the theories of 
warranty or strict liability must face the initial difficulty of 
establishing that these theories are available to him. The 1951 version 
of section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code limited the seller's 
warranty to "any natural person who is in the family or household of 
his buyer or who is a guest in his home. " 113 This section has now been 
amended to offer three alternative paragraphs,114 two of which would 
extend coverage to anyone "who may be reasonably expected to use, 
consume, or be affected by the goods. " 115 The spray victim, both the 
intended target and the innocent bystander, clearly would be able to 
assert a claim for breach of warranty under either of these two 
alternatives. 
defendant should have taken additional precautions. Hubbard-Hall Chern. Co. v. Silverman, 340 
l· . .:!d -102 (1st Cir. 1965) . . ";e,• W. PROSSER. supra note 70. § 35. at 205: Morris. \ltflra. at 157-
66. 
113 UNtfOR~I Co~t~IERCIAL CODE § 2-318. The drafters, however, made it clear that their 
position was neutral with respect to further extensions of the seller's warranties. !d., Comment 
3. Nevertheless, decisions have allowed injured bystanders to recover from the manufacturer 
under the implied warranty theory. See. e.g .• Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 
133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884·(Hartford 
County Super. Ct. 1963). 
'"U:-;tFOR~I Co~t~tF.RCIAL Com:§ 2-318, Alternatives A. B. C. 
.Ufd. § 2-318, Alternatives B. C (emphasis added). Alternative A continues to limit recovery 
to the family, household, and guests of the buyer. See J. HoNNOLD, LAW OF SALES AND 
SALES FtSANCISG, 150-52 (3d ed. 1968). 
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Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts allows the 
"user or consumer" of a product to assert a claim for strict tort 
liability,116 but takes no position on whether protection should be 
extended to persons other than users or consumers.117 A recent 
decision by the California Supreme Court may mark the beginning of 
a trend to permit bystanders to take advantage of the strict liability 
theory .U8 A fortiori, the intended victim also should be allowed to use 
the theory, since his relation to the product and its use is more 
intimate than that of a mere bystander. The suggested amendments to 
the Uniform Commercial Code provide further support for the 
argument that the target ought to be able to assert the theory of strict 
liability .119 Finally, it may be urged that the target is in fact a 
consumer, albeit an involuntary one, since the intended use of the 
product entails the inhalation of gases given off by the spray. The fact 
that the spray was designed to produce noxious results should make 
no difference if the injury sustained by the target exceeded the type 
and scope of harm the weapon was supposed to inflict. 
If the spray victim is able to utilize either the warranty or strict 
liability theory, he must still establish that the product was 
defective.120 The test under both theories probably would be whether 
the product is unreasonably dangerous.121 There are several ways in 
which a plaintiff may argue that a chemical spray should be so 
classified. He may point to a construction or design defect in the 
weapon;122 he may claim that the known dangers created by the 
spray are beyond the limits that should be tolerated for law 
enforcement .or self-defense purposes;123 or he may allege that a failure 
to give proper operating instructions and a sufficient warning of the 
hazards attendant the weapon's use render it unreasonably dangerous, 
and hence defectiveP~ As a practical matter, in most instances proof 
110 RESTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 402A. 
111/d., Caveat & comment o. 
""Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,_ Cal. 2d _, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 
(1969). 
"'See notes 114-115 supra and accompanying text. 
""The accidental discharge of a tear gas gun has been held not sufficient in itself to prove the 
existence of a defect. Gaw v. Lake Erie Chern. Co., 293 Ill. App. 123, II N.E.2d 982 (1937). 
mRESTATE~IENT § 402A, comment i. 
122See generally Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 
IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement 
of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963); Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations 
About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329 (1966). 
•nsee RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment i. Any decision on the merits of this issue would 
involve interesting policy considerations on police weaponry and the domestic arms race. 
'"ld. § 402A, commentj. 
1969] MACE 1257 
of unreasonable danger under any theory would also amount. to proof 
of negligence. 
Relationship of Injury and Recovery. The possible injuries which 
a chemical spray may inflict fall into three categories: transitorily 
disabling, prolonged, such as second-degree burns which eventually 
heal or impaired vision which eventually clears, and permanent. Any 
of these injuries would be sufficient to satisfy the required element of 
damage;125 however, if the intended target of the user sustains nothing 
more than transitorily disabling effects from a spray, the 
manufacturer should not be held liable, since the sprays are intended 
and designed to cause such harm.126 Furthermore, it may be that a 
court would require proof of permanent injuries before it ruled, as a 
matter of law, that a spray was defective because of its 
ultrahazardous nature.127 
Conduct of the User. If the user acted with due care, but sprayed 
an onlooker, even under circumstances which would constitute an 
unavoidable accident, the victim. nevertheless should be able to recover 
from the manufacturer upon satisfaction of the elements required by 
the aforementioned theories.128 When the user carelessly sprays a 
bystander and the injuries sustained derive from negligent or defective 
construction or design of the spray, the bystander should still be able 
to recover from the manufacturer under a theory of negligence, 
implied warranty, or strict liability. The user's intervening negligence 
or faulty marksmanship should not constitute misuse of the product 
such as to absolve the manufacturer of liability;129 such negligence is 
reasonably foreseeable, and should not insulate the manufacturer.130 If, 
however, the user's negligence is attributable to his failure to follow 
I:SSee \V. PROSSER § 30 (negligence); RESTATEMENT § 402A (strict tort liability); UNIFORM 
Co~IMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, comment 13 (warranty). 
•z•see note 26 supra. If the spray does what it is supposed to do, it is difficult to conceive 
how there can be any defect in the product or negligence on the part of the manufacturer. A 
bystander, however, who suffers such harm because a defect in the discharge mechanism caused 
a burst of liquid to go awry might well be able to recover against the manufacturer. 
msee note 123 supra. 
1""'See text accompanying notes 105-110 supra. 
no In cases asserting a theory of negligence, the manufacturer will be liable for harm 
sustained during the "normal use" of his product and will not be liable if injuries result "only 
because it is mishandled in a way which he has no reason to expect, or is used in some unusual 
and unforeseeable manner." RESTATE~!ENT § 395, comment j at 330. Comments g and h 
of § 402A limit strict tort liability to cases of "normal handling." 
•
30Cf. Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 2d 310, 282 P.2d 12 (1955). Plaintiff 
was injured by the ricochet of a defective cartridge fired in a shooting gallery. The court held 
that continued use of defective shells by the gallery operator, despite knowledge of the defect, 
should have been foreseeable by the manufacturer. 
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instructions in the handling of the weapon, the manufacturer at least 
cannot be at fault for failure to warn. As a practical matter, under 
these facts plaintiff would seem assured of recovery from either the 
manufacturer or the user, for it is clear that either the manufacturer 
failed to give proper warnings or instructions, or, if they were given, 
the user failed to heed them. 
When the plaintiff is the intended target and suffers more than 
transitorily disabling harm as a result of a construction or design 
defect in the spray or inadequate warnings and instructions in its use, 
he should clearly be able to recover from the manufacturer in 
situations in which the injuries are of a more serious nature than the 
user intended or would have been privileged to inflict. Whether or not 
the user had a privilege to use force should be irrelevant to the 
manufacturer's liability, since any firing of the weapon should have 
been foreseen as normal use. If the user had no privilege he would be 
liable jointly with the manufacturer. If the user knows that a spray 
can cause more than transitorily disabling injuries if fired in a certain 
manner, and he still discharges the weapon in that manner, the 
victim's injuries cannot be attributed to any failure to warn on the 
part of the manufacturer.131 A finding that such a user of a spray lost 
his privilege by employing excessive force would seem to carry with it 
a finding that he knew what he was doing; hence the manufacturer 
could not be charged with a failure to warn. 
LIABILITY OF THE RETAILER AND WHOLESALER 
The retailer of a spray sold to the public or to the police also 
might be liable, based on a negligent failure to warn of the spray's 
known dangers,1=12 breach of implied warranty of merchantability,133 or 
13
• An interesting problem might arise in the unlikely event that the user intended to cause 
transitorily disabling harm, but under the circumstances would have been privileged to inflict 
serious bodily injury and in fact did inflict such injury because of a defect in the construction or 
design of the weapon or in the instructions for its use. If the user would have nonetheless fired 
the weapon with knowledge of the defect and if the victim intentionally created the situation 
which gave rise to the privilege, then it is highly improbable that a court would allow the victim 
to recover against the manufacturer. If, however, he could prove that the user, although 
privileged to discharge the spray with knowledge of the defect, would not have done so, a court 
might be persuaded to hold the manufacturer liable. The victim's case would be even stronger if 
the privilege arose from the user·s reasonable but mistaken belief that he was threatened with 
serious bodily harm. 
The assumption here is that a court would place upon the manufacturer no higher duty than 
that of warning about the possibility of injury from certain uses or misuses of the weapon. Any 
higher duty suggests that the weapon as manufactun:d is defective because of its ultrahazardous 
nature. See text accompanying note 121 supra. 
1
"See 2 L. rRU~!ER & M. rRIED~IAS. supra note 103, § 18.02. 
133See 2 id. § 19.03[3]; UNtFOR~I CmntERCIAL CODE § 2-314. 
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strict liability.134 Furthermore, a retailer may be liable for negligence 
in selling a spray to a person he knows or should know may create 
an unreasonable risk of harm in his handling of the weapon.135 The 
purchaser of the spray might also have the additional remedies of 
breach of express warrantyt36 or breach of implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose.137 A wholesaler who sells sprays to salesmen 
for resale to the general public likewise might be liable under any of 
these theories,138 except possibly breach of implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose.139 Attempts by the manufacturer or seller to 
avoid liability by means of disclaimers printed on the canister or on 
separate documents will doubtless be treated with the same disfavor 
courts have generally evidenced toward disclaimers on consumer 
products.uo 
REGULATION OF CHEMICAL SPRAYS 
Any examination of the use of tort law as a means of achieving 
societal control over chemical sprays should also touch briefly upon 
the potential of other aspects of the legal process. Police misuse of 
sprays may be criminal as well as tortious, although resort to 
criminal prosecution has not proved an effective method of controlling 
police activity .141 The same generally has been true of resort to 
administrative procedures designed to handle civilian grievances 
against the police.142 
"'See 2 l. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN § 16A; RESTATEMENT § 402A. 
135Cf. 2 l. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN §§ 18.04A, .05; 3 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 26:18, :22 (1961). The manufacturer of PREVENTOR I requires the 
purchaser to sign a pledge that he will use the chemical spray only for defensive purposes. N.Y. 
Times, May 6, 1969, at 82, col. I. 
'"'See 2 l. FRU~IER & M. FRIED~IAN § 19.04; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-313. 
137See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED~IAN § 19.03[4]; UNIFOR~t CoM~IERCIAL CoDE§ 2-315. 
1
"'See 2 l. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN § 20. 
130This warranty would seem to arise only out of dealings between the seller and the 
purchaser. See authorities cited note 137 supra. 
uosee 2 l. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN§ 19.07. 
!USee P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN New YORK CITY 250-52 (1969); 
Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. Rev. 621 
(1955); Comment, Kill or Be Killed?: Use of Deadly Force in the Riot Situation, 56 CALIF. L. 
Rev. 829, 855-56 (1968). 
112See Ginger & Bell, supra note 84, §. 6, at 555; Note, The Administration of Complaints by 
Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. Rev. 499 (1964). 
A recent example of the questionable efficacy of such procedures is a San Francisco police 
report clearing a member of the city's Tactical Squad. He had sprayed a 23 year-old girl who 
was handcuffed and allegedly trying to get out of the patrol wagon where her mother and sister 
were also being held. San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. I, 1969, at I, col. I. The women, respected 
members of the black community, had been arrested at the scene of a traffic accident for failing 
to obey police orders. The report did call the use of MACE "questionable," and the officer in 
1260 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:1238 
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
There are other possible approaches to the problem, however, one 
of which is a class action to enjoin police departments from issuing or 
using sprays, at least in the absence of full instructions about their 
dangerous propensities.t43 Two such suits have already been ·filed 
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 144 one resulting in a 
consent decree whereby police officials have agreed: (l) to restrict the 
use of MACE to situations in which a blackjack or nightstick would 
be justified; (2) to refrain from using MACE on crowds ''unless there 
is a clear and present danger of a riot or an affray," in which case 
only after giving adequate warning; and (3) to insure that spray 
victims receive proper first aid as soon as possible.145 
An injunction also may be appropriate relief against repeated 
misuse of sprays by police. Although such relief has not been granted 
to date in a spray case, it has been allowed in other instances of police 
abuse of authority. In Lankford v. Gelston,146 an injunction was issued 
forbidding illegal searches. More recently, in the aftermath of the 
question was transferred from the Tactical Squad, yet it is not surprising that the San Francisco 
NAACP branded the report as a "cover-up and whitewash." /d. 
113See Ginger ~ Bell, supra note 84, at §§ 9, 43; Comment, The Federal Injunction as a 
Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968). 
tuSee note 84 supra. 
•••Bethea v. Monaghan, Civil No. 68-2529 (E.D. Pa., Mar. 12, 1969). Information about the 
consent decree was obtained in a telephone interview with Daniel Shertzer of Lancaster, Pa., 
counsel for plaintiffs. The other class suits are still in the pleading stages. One seeks relief 
against the uncontrolled, uninformed, and indiscriminate use of sprays, alleging that such use 
violates rights secured by the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. Lanier v. District of 
Columbia, No. 2318-68 (D.D.C., Sept. 13, 1968). The other asks for broad relief against a wide 
range of alleged police misconduct, citing police misuse of MACE as but one example of illegal 
activity utilized to deprive New Haven blacks of their constitutional rights of free speech, 
assembly, association, petition, movement and privacy, and freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Harris v. Lee, No. 12459 (D. Conn., filed Mar. 12, 1968). 
A similar suit, filed by prisoners in the Virginia State Penitentiary, resulted in a temporary 
order restraining prison officials from "the use of tear gas or deleterious chemicals against any 
individual inmate except in the most extraordinary circumstances and after approval in writing 
of the superintendent .... " Mason v. Peyton, No. 5611-R (E. D. Va. Aug. 13, 1968), 
UG364 F.2d 197 {4th Cir. 1966), noted in 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104. Plaintiffs' homes had been 
searched by the Baltimore police without warrants. Similar searches had been conducted in a 
black neighborhood over a 19 day period, pursuant to a plan designed to apprehend Negro 
suspects in a robbery in which several policemen were shot. Although the searches were confined 
to the 19 day period and the police commissioner had since issued an order forbidding them, the 
Fourth Circuit issued an injunction under § 1983. The court emphasized the morale-boosting 
function of such an injunction, which would be an effective gesture demonstrating the law's 
concern for ghetto injustices. Noting that money damages would be inadequate and not an 
effective deterrent to police misconduct, the court found that the police had suspended the 
searches not because they were illegal, but because they were ineffective, and therefore the issue 
raised was not moot. 364 F.2d at 202-03. 
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1968 Democratic National Convention, an injunction was found 
appropriate to prohibit police from interfering with news 
photographers.147 
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 
Federal legislation at present does not provide adequate safeguards 
for the production, sale, or use of chemical sprays. Moreover, 
administrative action has been laggard. Although the Justice 
Department, the Surgeon General, and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) have all taken tentative steps toward 
examining the effects of MACE as a police weapon, they have 
hesitated because of jurisdictional uncertainties.148 In addition, the 
Surgeon General and the FDA have displayed a considerable lack of 
coordination in dealing with the available data on the dangers of 
MACE.149 Nevertheless, some regulatory power exists, which 
potentially could serve as a basis to control chemical sprays. 
The Federal Hazardous Substances Act places certain labeling 
requirements on products intended for household use. Furthermore, if 
a product is deemed so dangerous that ''protection of the public 
health and safety can be adequately served only by keeping such 
substance . . . out of the channels of interstate commerce," it may 
even be banned.150 Since one of the adyertised purposes of the sprays 
is defense of the home,151 these weapons clearly fall within the ambit 
of the Act. 
A basic weakness of the Act, however; is that the Government 
117Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969). See generally WALKER REPORT, 
supra note 53. 
145See statement by Dr. James L. Goddard before the Subcomm. on Executive 
Reorganization of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, Apr. 17, 1969. 
"'To illustrate, on April 9, 1968, the Army notified the Surgeon General that MACE had 
failed to meet its safety requirements and furnished the data upon which this decision was based. 
See Letter of Brig. Gen. Donald D. Blackburn, supra note 43. The Surgeon General, however, 
made no mention of this tn his warning letter of May 2, 1968. Letter from the Surgeon General, 
supra note 35. Dr. Herbert L. Ley, Jr., the Commissioner of the FDA, later asserted that he did 
not learn of the Army's conclusion that MACE was unsafe until April 23, 1969, although he 
stated that he was aware of the Army's tests: See Office of Senator Frank E. Moss, News 
Release, June 2, 1969. 
•~15 U.S.C. § 1263 (Supp. IV, 1965-68), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1263 (1964). A hazardous 
substance is that which, inter alia, is corrosive or is an irritant and which foreseeably may cause 
substantial personal injury. 15 U.S.C. § 126l(f)(I)(A) (1964). A corrosive is that which causes 
destruction of tissue by chemical action. 15 U.S.C. 1261(i) (1964). An irritant induces a local 
inflammatory reaction after prolonged or repeated contact with normal tissue. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1261G) (1964). 
msee, e.g., SALESMAN's OPPORTUNITY, Apr. 1969, at 23 (ad for ON GUARD); SPECIALTY 
SALESMAN, Sept. 1968, at 29 (ad for PROTECTOR). 
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must prove that a product is mislabeled or ultrahazardous. This 
means that enforcement will depend upon the initiative of the FDA, 
the federal agency which administers the Act. To date, the FDA has 
recommended the type of labeling which should be placed on the 
sprays and has made two seizures of spray weapons.152 Yet the claim 
by Smith & Wesson's president, William G. Gunn, that another spray 
composed of a mustard gas derivative has been on sale to the public 
suggests that the FDA may not be doing enough.153 One solution 
would be legislation requiring pre-marketing clearance by the FDA 
before an aerosol chemical weapon may be sold to the public.15~ 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also could be a source of 
regulation, since it has authority to take action against deceptive 
practices in interstate commerce.155 The FTC therefore has the power 
to investigate spray advertising in order to ascertain whether any of 
the claims made are so misleading as to justify the issuance of cease 
and desist orders.156 The Department of Agriculture likewise has 
relevant regulatory powers. The Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act requires the seller of substances used to repel animals 
to register with the Department and enables the Department to 
regulate the sale of such substances.157 This authority could be utilized 
to control the few spray weapons which are advertised as dog 
repellants. 
The Post Office Department also has power to act, since it can 
ban the mailing of "chemical . . . devices . . . which may ignite or 
explode . . . and all other . . . material which may kill or injure 
another, or injure the mails or other property .... " 158 The 
Department has exercised this authority by barring CN sprays from 
shipment through the mails.159 Distributors, however, have easily 
sidestepped this restriction by employing other methods of shipment.160 
Finally, several jurisdictions have statutes making it a crime for 
152Consumer Hearings. supra note 18 (statement of Dr. Herbert L. Ley, Jr.). 
153Consumer Hearings (statement of William G. Gunn). 
"'Such a requirement would be analogous to the burden placed upon the manufacturers of 
new drugs. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1964). 
155 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). See generally Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967). 
"•For an expression of the FTC's intent to examine spray advertising, see Consumer 
Hearings (statement of Paul Rand Dixon). 
1577 u.s.c. §§ 135-35k (1964). 
158 18 u.s.c. § 1716 (1964). 
159Telephone interview with Post Office Department official, in Washington, D.C., May 16, 
1969. See also Wall Street Journal, supra note 18. 
100A published advertisement for BODY GUARD states: "Sending tear gas thru the Mail is 
illegal-we ship this ... via Express." See, e.g., SPECIALTY SALESMAN, Sept. 1968, at 66. 
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private citizens to possess, carry, or sell tear gas weapons, and/ or 
requiring licenses for such activities.161 Moreover, a number of states 
have enacted legislation regulating the possession of deadly or 
concealed weapons.162 Some court decisions, however, have 
distinguished between tear gas guns which can also fire live 
ammunition and tear gas weapons which discharge only a gas or 
spray, finding the latter outside the statutes.163 No state to date has 
enacted legislation dealing directly with aerosol sprays.16~ 
REALITY OF RELIEF 
The foregoing discussion of tort law and chemical sprays has 
examined the factual bases for personal injury litigation, the 
applicable tort theories, and various other legal approaches to the 
problem. There remains for considerati9n the practical factors which 
may affect both the outcome of damage suits and their impact upon 
the production, sale, and use of these weapons. 
A recent article on the control of police behavior argues that "a 
civil action against a police officer is perhaps least satisfactory, both 
as a means of seeking redress and as a means for positively 
influencing police conduct. " 165 To what degree does this observation 
161 In twelve jurisdictions, the statutory provisions seem broad enough to regulate sprays. 
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-4518 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 12400-35 (West 1956), as amended, 
(West Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. STAT.§§ 13"4-1 to -15 (1968); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 24-1 
(1964); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 732.10-.14 (1950); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.224 (1969); 
Nev. REv. STAT. §§ 202.370-.380 (1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:I44-l, :151-60 (1953); N.C. 
GeN. STAT. § 14.401.6 (1953); WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. § 70.74.310 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 164.20 (1957); N.Y. CITY AD~IIN. CODE § 436-5.0(e) (Supp. 1969). In other jurisdictions, 
only tear gas bombs are prohibited and the wording of the statutes is probably too narrow to 
include sprays. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2453-54 (Supp. 1965). See also S.C. CODE 
ANN.§ 16-147 (1962) (limited to tear gas guns); PA. STAT. ANN.§§ 3861-62 (1963) (limited to 
use ~ftear gas against persons involved in labor disputes); VA. CODE ANN.§ 6618.1-70 (Supp. 
1968) (use of tear gas prohibited except in self-defense and defense of property). 
162See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-4706 (Supp. 
1968); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN.§ 159:4 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 2A:I51-19, -31, -41 
(1953), as amended, (Supp. 1968); N.Y. PENAL LAW ANN.§ 265.05 (McKinney, 1967); W.VA. 
CODE ANN.§ 61-7-1 (1966). 
103See, e.g., State v. Umbrello, 106 N.H. 336, 211 A.2d 400 (1965); People v. Anderson, 236 
App. Div. 586, 260 N.Y.S. 329 (1932); Village of Barboursville ex rei. Bates v. Taylor, 115 W. 
Va. 4, 174 S.E. 485 (1934). See also United States v. Decker, 292 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1961) (tear 
gas gun capable of firing shotgun shell is firearm within meaning of National Firearms Act); 
State v. Seng, 91 N.J. Super. 50, 219 A.2d 185 (App. Div. 1966) (whether tear gas gun is 
firearm is question of fact). 
161 For an account of an unsuccessful attempt to pass such legislation in Indiana, see the 
Indianapolis Star, Feb. 16, 1969, at I, col. 4. 
165Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. 
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 160, 168 (1967). 
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bear on MACE cases? Spray victims of course will face the usual 
obstacles that confront any attempted recovery against police officers. 
Because such suits amount to an attack on the law enforcement 
establishment, they will be defended vigorously.166 "Juries are not 
likely to have compassion for a plaintiff, however abused, if he is 
guilty of a crime or disreputable. " 167 Judges may reflect the same 
attitudes. Furthermore, spray cases involving demonstrators may have 
political overtones, thus perhaps prejudicing the resolution of 
questions such as whether excessive force was applied or whether the 
use of the spray created an unreasonable risk of harm. If plaintiff 
manifests political views that are repugnant to the court or the jury, 
the police officer's privilege to use force likely will be construed 
liberally. Popular attitudes favoring the police violence at the 1968 
Democratic Convention in Chicago suggest support for this 
proposition.168 
A related consideration is that valid claims often may not be 
asserted. Although spray injuries include pain, discomfort, burns, and 
impairment of vision, few involve permanent harm. In most cases, 
therefore, special damages may be rather modest. Furthermore, a law 
suit, particularly one based on products liability, would not be easy 
and might prove expensive. Consequently, the likely litigation costs, 
when weighed against the possibility and amount of a favorable 
y,erdict, may discourage victims from asserting claims and attorneys 
from accepting such cases. This could be a critical problem i'n spray 
incidents which occur at a considerable distance from the 
manufacturer and from doctors or scientists who might be willing to 
testify for the plaintiff.169 One possible solution to the problem is for 
attorneys with claims against one particular manufacturer to pool 
1"/d. 
U1Jd. One of the pending cases involves an Indian who was drunk at the time he was 
sprayed. Miguel v. Hinderliter, No. C217921 (Ariz. Super. Ct., filed Nov. 22, 1968). The 
plaintiff in one potential MACE case has been described as "a somewhat unattractive person, 
... serving a jail term in another county." Letter from his attorney, Apr. 29, 1969, on file with 
author. Another potential spray plaintiff has been described as "a contentious individual •.. 
[who] may well have a psychological deficit stemming from the time of his birth." Letter from 
his attorney, Dec. 4, 1968, on. file with author. 
1~Gallup, Majority Back Chicago Police, LAW OFFICER, Fall, 1968, at 23; cf. OPHTHALMIC 
OBSERVER, Feb. 1969,-at 3 (487 of 604 opthalmologists polled favored use of MACE by police); 
N.Y. Times, Dec. I, 1968, at 40, col. I (students and faculty at Duquesne University voted 
I, I 13 to 192 in favor of keeping MACE on campus). 
IGIThis factor was cited by a Georgia attorney as the principal obstacle to the filing of a 
number of claims by Negroes who had been sprayed by police. Lettl!r to author, from. John D. 
Mattox, Dec. 14, 1968. 
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their talents and information.l7° As yet no such cooperative effort has 
been attempted. 
In addition to the problem of expense, ghetto dwellers or 
individuals not within the mainstream of society may have such a 
distrust of the legal process that they are unwilling to submit 
themselves to the demands of trial preparation and actual litigation.171 
This attitude may extend even to the middle class, in which a 
reluctance to "get involved" may inhibit recourse to the courts.172 
Another deterrent is the possibility that the institution of a damage 
suit might provoke the filing of criminal charges against the plaintiff, 
if such charges had not already been brought. 
Besides the fact that damage suits against policemen are difficult to 
win, and that individuals with valid claims do not bring them, a further 
drawback is the unlikelihood that a verdict for plaintiff will achieve 
any positive results. As Judge Sobeloff, in holding that the plaintiffs 
in Lankford had no adequate remedy at law, explained: 
There can be little doubt that actions for money damages would not 
suffice to repair the injury suffered by the victims of the police 
searches. Neither the personal assets of policemen nor the nominal 
bonds they furnish afford genuine hope of redress. . . . Moreover, 
the lesson of experience is that the remote possibility of money 
damages serves as no deterrent to future police invasions.173 
This observation would seem equally applicable to the misuse of 
chemical sprays. 
Furthermore, the extent to which tort recoveries can affect the 
manufacturers and distributors of sprays is uncertain. The chemical 
weapons business is quite profitable.174 If the manufacturers and 
110See generally Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster 
Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968). 
171 Attorneys in Washngton, D.C., have told the author of two promising spray cases which 
were never pursued for these reasons. A potential spray plaintiff on the west coast has been 
described as having "little more patience with the processes of law in a personal injury case thari 
he does with th~ activity of the local police departments." Letter from his attorney, Dec. 4, 
1968, on file with author. One of the pending spray cases may have to be dropped because of 
lack of cooperation by plaintiff. Telephone interview with attorney for plaintiff, Apr. 1969. 
"The poor man thinks of the policeman as someone who pushes him around, and the lawyer 
is always the man who takes something away from him." Address by Mr. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, 18th Annual Conference of Judges and Lawyers of the 7th Federal Circuit Court 
District, May 9, 1969, in CRIME CONTROL DIGEST, May 22, 1969, at II. 
17zAttorneys in San Francisco cited these reasons to the author to explain why a minister and 
a Negro middle class family did not bring lawsuits to vindicate seemingly valid claims against 
the police for the misuse of MACE. 
173Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Wildstrom, Mugged by 
the Sheriffs: An Anecdote, NATION, Apr. 21, 1969, at 496. 
msee Wall Street Journal, supra note 18. 
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sellers carry product liability insurance,175 they may be able to pass 
the costs of damage suits to the consumer by adjusting the price of 
the product to reflect any increase in their insurance premiums. 
Does the conclusion therefore follow that tort law has no role to 
play in the effort to achieve meaningful control over the possession, 
sale, and use of chemical sprays? Several positive factors suggest that 
it may be premature to dismiss its potential. First, it is by no means 
certain that spray victims have little hope of recovery. Plaintiffs in 
some of the spray cases already filed are far from disreputable.l7° 
Also, the presence of the manufacturer as a defendant along with the 
police or the municipality can put the plaintiff in the advantageous 
position of pleading his case in such a way that one defendant or the 
other must be liable.177 
The impact which the filing of one damage suit in the District of 
Columbia has already had is noteworthy. After a claim was brought 
against several policemen and the District, the D.C. Department of 
Public Health was requested to conduct research on the spray weapon 
involved.178 Though finding no evidence of any risk of eye injury, the 
study revealed that the inhalation of large quantities of vapors from 
the spray could cause lung and kidney damage.179 Unfortunately, the 
Department has seen fit to suppress the study. 
The threat of potential damage suits also had an interesting 
impact in San Francisco, where the City and County Charter forbids 
the elected Board of Supervisors to interfere in administrative 
affairs,t80 which include police matters. Members of the Board 
disGussed the possibility that damage suits against the City and 
County arising from police misuse of sprays might deplete the public 
treasury. Citing this as justification they passed a resolution calling 
upon the police department to suspend the use of sprays until the 
1751n an interesting case it was held that the premises-liability insurance of a seller of tear gas 
devices did not extend to the defense and settlement of a claim arising from the illegal sale of 
such a device to a minor. Hagen Supply Corp. v. Iowa Nat'! Mut. Ins. Co., 33 I F.2d 199 (8th 
Cir. 1964). 
176Jennings v. City of Winter Park, Civil No. 68-4047 (Fla. Cir. Ct., filed Sept. 6, 1968) 
(plaintiff is a 68 year-old attorney and past president of a county bar association); Vaughn v. 
City of Estacade, No. 342266, (Ore. Cir. Ct., filed Oct. 2, 1968) (plaintiff was an infant less 
than a year old when sprayed). 
111See p. 1258 supra. 
118See Washington Evening Star, Feb. 24, 1969, § B. at 4, col. I; Washington Post, Feb. 23, 
1969, § A, at 21, col. I. 
119 Washington Post, supra note 178. 
'""City & County of San Francisco, Charter, § 22 (1932). 
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Board of Health could study the weapons and assess the dangers they 
posed.181 
Moreover, publicity emanating from tort litigation may bestir 
police departments to reevaluate their policy on sprays. The wide 
press coverage given the Surgeon General's letter resulted in the 
suspension of the use of sprays by a number of departments 
throughout the countryt82-a reaction which reflects the role of public 
relations in law enforcement and suggests what the stimulus of 
adverse publicity can do. Further focus on the dangers of sprays by the 
mass media can drive home at least the necessity of careful and 
controlled use of the weapons and the need for prompt treatment of 
victims. 
Another positive aspect of damage suits is that they may provide 
significant data on the issue of whether and to what extent the sprays 
can cause permanent damage. Indeed, in a sense one may look upon 
the spray victim-plaintiffs as subjects of a nationwide experiment in 
the use of chemical aerosols in law enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
The hazards created by the public sale of chemical sprays may be 
said to constitute a consumer protection problem and hence raise 
issues which are politically popular and "safe" for legislators and 
administrators. Existing state and federal laws provide a basis for the 
exercise of some degree of regulation over these weapons. Additional 
federal legislation may be forthcoming.183 The use of sprays by the 
police presents a considerably more difficult problem. There are no 
laws regulating the manufacture or use of police sprays, and the 
present delicacy of the "law-and-order" issue militates against the 
passage of such legislation. 
This leaves the courts as a final barrier to the unfettered 
production and use of chemical sprays for law enforcement. The 
judicial process has the capability to provide a forum both for the 
dispassionate resolution of the factual issues which underlie the 
MACE controversy and for the imposition of rational public 
restraints upon the manufacture and use of these weapons. The 
substantive rules to be applied in damage actions and suits for 
equitable relief provide an adequate means of achieving these results. 
181 lnterview with Terry A. Francois, Esq., Member, Board of Supervisors, City and County 
of San Francisco, Cal., in San Francisco, Apr. 9, 1969. 
102See CRIME CONTROL DIGEST, May 22, 1968, at 10; NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1968, at 79; 
TIME, May 17, 1968, at 52 . 
... See Office of Senator Frank E. Moss, supra note 149. 
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How judges and jurors will apply these rules is the crucial question. 
Whether the courts will accept the challenge and the extent to which 
the judicial process can regulate the utilization of chemical warfare 
technology by domestic law enforcement agencies will reflect to a 
significant degree the law's role and relevance in dealing with the 
pressures which are presently straining at the seams of the American 
social fabric. 
